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This tragedy in Argentine history is surrounded with mystery and tenifring consequences
for the Argentine people. The casualty count ranged from 10,000 to 30,000 people. Innocent
people as well as opponents of the military state would disappear in the middle of the night.
These people are known as los desaparecidos.
The so called war began in 1976 and did not end until the election of Raul Alfonsins on
Dec.l0, 1983. How and why did the military start this war of repression? But more importantly
why did the Argentine remain silent for 7 years l
Let's start at the beginning when the military junta led a coup against Isabel Peron the
wife of former president Juan Peron in 1976. The term The Dirty War was first used by the army
for the battles against the leftist guerrillas.
The military state declared war against the leftist and anyone the state considered
subversive. "The state was ambiguously even if covertly, involved in committing terrorist acts
and in using its military and police to kill its perceived enemies. Complicating our
understanding of this period are the many sub-struggles that were in progress, competition for
power within the unions bureaucracy and between Peronist and dissent unions. The Peronist
movement embraced both the extreme right and the extreme 1eft."(1) Some assassinations
carried out by the state were blamed on the guerrillas.
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"The Triple A (Argentine Anti Communist Alliance) was an orgaruzation established
within the Ministry of Social Welfare in Isabel Peron government. Triple A targeted both known
left wing leaders and suspected members of supporting subversive actives" (2)
Neoliberalism was the guiding ideology of Peronism, the military undertook the task of
imposing this market ideology on the economy of the state. The military had to kill offall actual
and potential opponents.
The military government disclaimed all knowledge of the where about of los
desaparecidos. The thinkers, professors, writers and the politically inclined that might be in
dissent feared for the safety of their children.
So why did the Argentine kept silence about the state's brutally oppressive acts of terror?
The answer lies with the state use of fear. Fear was an essential weapon in the military's plan to
seize, purged and remolded Argentina. "Everyday the newspapers, radios and televisions
brought fresh news from the front as though it was a civil war. By March 1976 many Argentine
felt they have reached the limits to their feelings of personal insecurity. Bombing, kidnappings
were daily presence. (3)
The military government had conspired early on with the media to make the press as a
faithful propaganda instrument of the state. "Wamings notes sent by the presidential press
secretariat for having published inconvenient information or a telephone call how to play a story
or to wam about an article considered of[ensive."(a) The junta press policy was clear, up to ten
years imprisonment for news communiqu6s or images for the purpose of damaging or impairing
the reputation of the actives of the armed forces, security forces or police. "The message could
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be even more to the point. Hector Garcia publisher of the tabloid Cronica was kidnapped and
held with a hood over his head for 48 hours by military officers carrying out a preventive
waming it was Garcia second abduction in less than three years."(5)
The violence gradually was subsiding in Argentina and the fear factor while still in place
began to be replaced by denial. "social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell one of Argentina's most
prestigious social scientist and wife, psychologist Cecilia Gallia conducted a fluid study on fear
and the military rule. Their finding indicated that Argentine tend to deny what was going around
them. (6)
"Most said they preferred the peace established by the military to the chaos of the
Peronist r6gime. Reports of massive right violations were chalked up as unsubstantiated rumors,
with respondents frequently atfiibuting cases of repressive violence they knew about even
disappearances to be the work of a few ctazies."(l)
Yet at the same time within family structure, O'Donnell and Gallia fotrnd that a mini
regime of terror had taken root, as parents terrified their children would become involved in
"something" tried to control their children. The terror regime also acted on Argentine sense of
class segregation. [n Buenos Aires the dirty war tactic was used to address another unwanted
problem the city slum dwellers. The military would send trucks into a shantytown, usually at
night or early morning loading up the residents and what ever the residents could carry to be
dumped like trash outside the crty limits.
The military treatnent of the poor contrasted with the treatment of the poor by the
Peronist govemment who had championed the cause of the poor. ooFour years of military rule
found city officials bragged that76Yoof city slum dwellers had been removed! To live in
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Buenos Aires is not just for everyone, but for those who deserves a better city for the best
city."(8)
Argentina was not the only one who is in denial. The world turned a blind eye to the
state sponsored terrorism. . The human rights violations were ignored by various U.S.
administrations. Conservative administrations like the Nixon's and Reagan's adminisftations,
while not wanting to be linked with the anti-Communist military tactics of the junta nevertheless
were in sympathy with the junta ideology. The U.S. concern was that Communism sponsored by
leftist factions in South America could achieve another Cuba in South America.
A fear shared by Western Europe. This fear kept Westem Europe involvement to a
minimum. This encouraged the military state and possibly had an effect on some Argentine to
become silent and accepts the terrorism tactics of the military government.
The Elite Class of Argentina was least at risk from the government acts of terrorism.
lndeed the Elite Class welcomed the security that ttre junta offered to those who shared their
views on the economy and politics. So there were many reasons for Argentine silence about the
Dirty War.
I think we can agree that the number one reason was the fear factor. The submission of
whole nation was due to many factors but the uncertain acts of kidnappings, murder and the
disappearance of one's children was compelling and made many Argentines repressed under the
military state. Those Argentines who support the state of course would not find fault with what
was seen as necessary to rid Argentina of leftist subversion. Finally denial and the use of these
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repressive military terror tactics were used to remove the undesirables a solution sought by the
state and those who supported it.
Argentina's Dirty War was the reaction of the military state and the Elite Class to
decades of Peronist influence. It was the fear of the Right who had lost power and their security
that encouraged the military to overthrow Isabel Peron and begin the reign of terror.
Under the Peron leadership the Working Class had gained the upper hand. Unions and
social reforms progftLms for the Lower Class became the driving force for Peron's support.
These changes by Juan Peron was loved by the very large Working Class but was in part paid for
by the Elite Landowners. Traditionally the Elite held power in Argentina that also included the
military. The Elite saw Peron's policies as Leftist in sprit. Peron was not a leftist but rather a
dictator more in line with a Fascist. Peron who was hated by those who felt he had betayed the
ruling class, which had ruled since colonial days.
Fearfrrl of a Socialist or Communist take over the military overthrow the Peron
government in 1956. In those days the unions his strongest backers were in disagreement and
even were demonstating. Sensing the timing was right the military junta depose Peron at his
politically weakest. The decades that followed saw factionalism grow in politics and the
military. The Frondizi Presidency had some successes with the economy at first but lost ground
again was seen as too Peronist like and the military step in again in 1962. The political struggle
with the Peronist and military continued until Peron retumed rn1973.
Peron retum was short and ended n 1974 when he died. Isabel Peron became President
and faced many challenges from the military and the Right until finally the military depose
Isabel and began the Dirty War in 1976. T}rre Argentine Military had planned since 1975 for
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secret czlmps locations. The Argentine Military practiced the forced disappearance of people that
was systematic, massive and secretive.
"It required building 340 secret centers in which victims were housed and preparing mass
graves for their burial. It included task forces to work the streets and hundreds of people to staff
the centers. (9) The military government struggled with the economy with some success but
with power came comrption.
The military influence over the society had reached new height not only generals were
dividing up public posts, but hundreds of retired and active duty officers took up positions on
boards of private companies and managerial spots in multinational corporations. "Military men
and civilian intelligence personnel began showing up the homes and offices of the relatives of
missing people and those of implied dissent. Passports, imformation, or merely not being killed
were possible for a price.(lO)
"In Buenos Aires and Cordoba military men set up furniture and appliance stores stacked
with goods looted from homes of the disappeared."(10) These acts of comrption were among the
many that would eventually lead to the down fall of the military rule and the end of the Dirty
War. Rumors of human rights violations began to break out of Argentina by the family members
of the Deparecidos.
The policies of the U.S. addressing the Dirty War were for the most part hands offpolicy
because it was the height of Cold War with the Communist. It was feared that South America
could tum to Casto's Cuba for inspiration and become the new Commtrnist block. When Latin
counties began to adopt Anti-Communist polices of the Right Wing Washington D.C. tried to
ignore the repressive policies of the Latin dictatorial states. The U.S did not support or even
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recognized the human rights issues in Argentina. The U.S. refused for three years to take any
action on human rights violations in fear of a Communist take over in Argentina.
Comrption and human rights violation increasingly became public to the Argentine and
the rest of the world as the military junta lost control. The intimidation and suppression of the
Argentine by the use of the brutal force of death squads and the uncertainty of when and where
one's children may disappear caused Argentine to question the junta propaganda that Argentina
was at war. Although the enemy was not a foreign power the propaganda fied to use this fear
tactic as a means to instill nationality. The real fears were those of the military and the Elite
Class. The subversion was the possible return to Peronism. The possible return of Leftist power
and the possible submission of the ruling class fed the motivation for the Dirty War.
Growing opposition to the human rights violations and comrption that the military was so
tangibly linked too led the military junta to search for some sort of dishaction. The Junta needed
a diversion to detract the Argentine from the abuses and comrptions of their government. Facing
possible civil war and a lost of power the junta would appeal to Argentine national pride. The
junta would call for the retaking of the Los Islas Malvinas which has been disputed since the
1820's with England. The British would have to leave!
The Argentine Military had incorrectly supposed that England did not have much fight
left in it and was not the roaring lion of colonial days. The Argentine Junta believed Argentine
Forces could easily defeat the British if the British would even fight at all. The junta felt
England's supply and refueling issues was beyond their capability. The junta did not count on
that the U.S. would come to the aid of Britain
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The British viewed the action that was taken by Argentina as a serious slap to British
willingness to maintain its position as a world power. The invasion by Argentine Forces was
unacceptable to England's. New Priminister, Margaret Thatcher. When it became clear that
President Regan would side with England the junta was stumped thinking the U.S. would
naturally side with their anti Communist ally in South America-
The Falkland War lasted 72 days at a cost unsustainable for the junta. Tllre 72 day war
revile that England was still a great military power. The British had taken 9,800 Argentine
prisoners, destroyed several capital Argentine ships and killed many Argentine sailors. The
Argentine Army was not as professional as the British. The Argentine Army was mostly
conscripts. The lost of the war brought the junta reglme to collapse. The cries of the people in
the sfieets were that the government had failed miserably not only in the war but also on
inflation, comrption and human rights abuses. This was the last staw, facing public overthrow
the junta gave up.
*The junta step down in 1982 and restored basic civil liberties and retracted its ban on
political parties. The Dify War ended when Raul Alfonsin,s Civil Government took control of
the cotrnty on Dec,I0,1983.(11)
Argentina's Dirty War began because of the fears of the Right Wing and the weakness of
the Isabel Peron government. These conditions presented the military with the opportunity it
needed to seize power and start its rule of terror. The military had its roots with the Elite Class
especially the navy and their views were very conservative. The Working Class and the unions
were at odds with the Peron Government and were too weak to resist the military take over.
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Anyone who distend or resisted would be seen as a leftist and subversive they would be
considered a threat to the govemment.
The junta paranoid about a counter coup took extraordinary steps to prevent such a coup
from the realm of possibility. The main tool to make the Argentine so dossal as I have nied to
demonstrate was Fear! The government's use of propaganda and the censorship of any opposing
views also were very affective. Kidnapping and torture by the military had been denied by some
Argentines because they viewed the actions of the military as totally necessary for security.
The setting up of detention camps at least a full year before the coup started indicated the
military had plans to deal with the enemies of the state. A solution was planned. The sudden
disappearance of friends, neighbors and even one's own children earn the military's required
silence. Even today there are hundreds of Argentine parents still searching for their kidnapped
children stolen in the middle of the night. Terror used to hold the silence of a nation. If that was
not enough coercion the use of bombings and assignations on a daily bases by the Death Squads
would also insure silence from the opposition. The Elite after seeing the influence of the
Peronist did not questioned what the military seen as necessary to bring back order. The Elite
wanted Argentina retumed back to them and if some unwanted persons were hauled offlike trash
then the military did Argentina a favor.
Therefore in conclusion it is my belief that the brutal tactics of the military junta were
employed to not only to silence the leftist ideology but also to insure the silent compliance of the
Argentine people. The Elite Class shared the view with the military that the ideology of the
Right would restore order and the dominance of their class. Surly these seven years of terror has
to be seen as the darkest days of Argentina's history. Argentina's Dirty War did not win the
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